Fork ESP-IDF's bluetooth component

i want better sbc encoding, and no cla will stop me

1 files changed, 126 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/bt/test_apps/main/test_smp.c b/lib/bt/test_apps/main/test_smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ea89ec26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/bt/test_apps/main/test_smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021-2023 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense OR CC0-1.0
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Tests for the BLE SMP implementation
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
+#include "freertos/task.h"
+#include "unity.h"
+#include "esp_random.h"
+
+#include "esp_bt_main.h"
+#include "esp_bt_device.h"
+#include "esp_gap_ble_api.h"
+
+#define KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256 8
+
+typedef unsigned long  DWORD;
+typedef uint32_t UINT32;
+
+typedef struct {
+    DWORD x[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+    DWORD y[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+    DWORD z[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+} Point;
+
+typedef struct {
+    // curve's coefficients
+    DWORD a[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+    DWORD b[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+
+    //whether a is -3
+    int a_minus3;
+
+    // prime modulus
+    DWORD p[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+
+    // Omega, p = 2^m -omega
+    DWORD omega[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256];
+
+    // base point, a point on E of order r
+    Point G;
+
+} elliptic_curve_t;
+
+extern void ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(Point *q, Point *p, DWORD *n, uint32_t keyLength);
+extern bool ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(Point *p);
+extern void p_256_init_curve(UINT32 keyLength);
+extern elliptic_curve_t curve_p256;
+
+static void bt_rand(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    if (!len) {
+        return;
+    }
+    // Reset the buf value to the fixed value.
+    memset(buf, 0x55, len);
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < (int)(len / sizeof(uint32_t)); i++) {
+        uint32_t rand = esp_random();
+        memcpy(buf + i * sizeof(uint32_t), &rand, sizeof(uint32_t));
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("ble_smp_public_key_check", "[ble_smp]")
+{
+    /* We wait init finish 200ms here */
+    vTaskDelay(200 / portTICK_PERIOD_MS);
+    Point public_key;
+    DWORD private_key[KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256] = {[0 ... (KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256 - 1)] = 0x12345678};
+    p_256_init_curve(KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
+    ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(&public_key, &(curve_p256.G), private_key, KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
+    /* Check Is the public key generated by the system on the given elliptic curve */
+    TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
+    /* We simulate the attacker and set the y coordinate of the public key to 0. */
+    for (int i = 0; i < KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256; i++) {
+        public_key.y[i] = 0x0;
+    }
+    /* At this point the public key should not be on the given elliptic curve. */
+    TEST_ASSERT(!ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
+    /* Test whether the G point on the protocol is on a given elliptic curve */
+    TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&(curve_p256.G)));
+    /* test 100 times when the private key is generated by the random number. */
+    for (int j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
+        bt_rand(private_key, sizeof(DWORD)*KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
+        ECC_PointMult_Bin_NAF(&public_key, &(curve_p256.G), private_key, KEY_LENGTH_DWORDS_P256);
+        /* Check Is the public key generated by the system on the given elliptic curve */
+        TEST_ASSERT(ECC_CheckPointIsInElliCur_P256(&public_key));
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_CASE("ble_smp_set_clear_static_passkey", "[ble_smp]")
+{
+    /* We wait init finish 200ms here */
+    vTaskDelay(200 / portTICK_PERIOD_MS);
+    esp_ble_auth_req_t auth_req = ESP_LE_AUTH_BOND;
+    uint32_t passkey = 123456;
+    /* test len = 0 when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_AUTHEN_REQ_MODE, &auth_req, 0) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test function */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_AUTHEN_REQ_MODE, &auth_req, sizeof(esp_ble_auth_req_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test type >= ESP_BLE_SM_MAX_PARAM */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_MAX_PARAM, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test len < sizeof(uint32_t) when type is ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint8_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test value is NULL when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, sizeof(uint8_t)) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test value is NULL and len is 0 when type != ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, 0) == ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test function */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_SET_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test function */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, &passkey, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test function */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, sizeof(uint32_t)) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+    /* test function */
+    TEST_ASSERT(esp_ble_gap_set_security_param(ESP_BLE_SM_CLEAR_STATIC_PASSKEY, NULL, 0) != ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
+}