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diff --git a/lib/bt/common/tinycrypt/src/cmac_mode.c b/lib/bt/common/tinycrypt/src/cmac_mode.c
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/lib/bt/common/tinycrypt/src/cmac_mode.c
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+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2025 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) CO LTD
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ */
+
+/*
+ *  Copyright (C) 2017 by Intel Corporation, All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ *  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ *  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ *    - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *     this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ *    - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ *    - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ *  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ *  AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ *  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ *  ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ *  LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ *  CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ *  SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ *  INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ *  CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ *  ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ *  POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <tinycrypt/aes.h>
+#include <tinycrypt/cmac_mode.h>
+#include <tinycrypt/constants.h>
+#include <tinycrypt/utils.h>
+
+/* max number of calls until change the key (2^48).*/
+const static uint64_t MAX_CALLS = ((uint64_t)1 << 48);
+
+/*
+ *  gf_wrap -- In our implementation, GF(2^128) is represented as a 16 byte
+ *  array with byte 0 the most significant and byte 15 the least significant.
+ *  High bit carry reduction is based on the primitive polynomial
+ *
+ *                     X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1,
+ *
+ *  which leads to the reduction formula X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1. Indeed,
+ *  since 0 = (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) and since
+ *  addition of polynomials with coefficients in Z/Z(2) is just XOR, we can
+ *  add X^128 to both sides to get
+ *
+ *       X^128 = (X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1)
+ *
+ *  and the coefficients of the polynomial on the right hand side form the
+ *  string 1000 0111 = 0x87, which is the value of gf_wrap.
+ *
+ *  This gets used in the following way. Doubling in GF(2^128) is just a left
+ *  shift by 1 bit, except when the most significant bit is 1. In the latter
+ *  case, the relation X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 says that the high order bit
+ *  that overflows beyond 128 bits can be replaced by addition of
+ *  X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 <--> 0x87 to the low order 128 bits. Since addition
+ *  in GF(2^128) is represented by XOR, we therefore only have to XOR 0x87
+ *  into the low order byte after a left shift when the starting high order
+ *  bit is 1.
+ */
+const unsigned char gf_wrap = 0x87;
+
+/*
+ *  assumes: out != NULL and points to a GF(2^n) value to receive the
+ *            doubled value;
+ *           in != NULL and points to a 16 byte GF(2^n) value
+ *            to double;
+ *           the in and out buffers do not overlap.
+ *  effects: doubles the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "in" and places
+ *           the result in the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "out."
+ */
+void gf_double(uint8_t *out, uint8_t *in)
+{
+
+	/* start with low order byte */
+	uint8_t *x = in + (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+
+	/* if msb == 1, we need to add the gf_wrap value, otherwise add 0 */
+	uint8_t carry = (in[0] >> 7) ? gf_wrap : 0;
+
+	out += (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (;;) {
+		*out-- = (*x << 1) ^ carry;
+		if (x == in) {
+			break;
+		}
+		carry = *x-- >> 7;
+	}
+}
+
+int tc_cmac_setup(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *key, TCAesKeySched_t sched)
+{
+
+	/* input sanity check: */
+	if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0 ||
+	    key == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	/* put s into a known state */
+	_set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+	s->sched = sched;
+
+	/* configure the encryption key used by the underlying block cipher */
+	tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(s->sched, key);
+
+	/* compute s->K1 and s->K2 from s->iv using s->keyid */
+	_set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
+	gf_double (s->K1, s->iv);
+	gf_double (s->K2, s->K1);
+
+	/* reset s->iv to 0 in case someone wants to compute now */
+	tc_cmac_init(s);
+
+	return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int tc_cmac_erase(TCCmacState_t s)
+{
+	if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	/* destroy the current state */
+	_set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+
+	return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int tc_cmac_init(TCCmacState_t s)
+{
+	/* input sanity check: */
+	if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	/* CMAC starts with an all zero initialization vector */
+	_set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	/* and the leftover buffer is empty */
+	_set(s->leftover, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	s->leftover_offset = 0;
+
+	/* Set countdown to max number of calls allowed before re-keying: */
+	s->countdown = MAX_CALLS;
+
+	return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int tc_cmac_update(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	/* input sanity check: */
+	if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+	if (data_length == 0) {
+		return  TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+	}
+	if (data == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	if (s->countdown == 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	s->countdown--;
+
+	if (s->leftover_offset > 0) {
+		/* last data added to s didn't end on a TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE byte boundary */
+		size_t remaining_space = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
+
+		if (data_length < remaining_space) {
+			/* still not enough data to encrypt this time either */
+			_copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], data_length, data, data_length);
+			s->leftover_offset += data_length;
+			return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+		}
+		/* leftover block is now full; encrypt it first */
+		_copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset],
+		      remaining_space,
+		      data,
+		      remaining_space);
+		data_length -= remaining_space;
+		data += remaining_space;
+		s->leftover_offset = 0;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
+			s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i];
+		}
+		tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
+	}
+
+	/* CBC encrypt each (except the last) of the data blocks */
+	while (data_length > TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
+			s->iv[i] ^= data[i];
+		}
+		tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
+		data += TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		data_length  -= TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if (data_length > 0) {
+		/* save leftover data for next time */
+		_copy(s->leftover, data_length, data, data_length);
+		s->leftover_offset = data_length;
+	}
+
+	return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int tc_cmac_final(uint8_t *tag, TCCmacState_t s)
+{
+	uint8_t *k;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	/* input sanity check: */
+	if (tag == (uint8_t *) 0 ||
+	    s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
+		return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	if (s->leftover_offset == TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* the last message block is a full-sized block */
+		k = (uint8_t *) s->K1;
+	} else {
+		/* the final message block is not a full-sized  block */
+		size_t remaining = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
+
+		_set(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], 0, remaining);
+		s->leftover[s->leftover_offset] = TC_CMAC_PADDING;
+		k = (uint8_t *) s->K2;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
+		s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i] ^ k[i];
+	}
+
+	tc_aes_encrypt(tag, s->iv, s->sched);
+
+	/* erasing state: */
+	tc_cmac_erase(s);
+
+	return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
+}